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Abstract
We present a methodology that allows to calculate the impact of a given Long-
Term Care (LTC) insurance protection system on the risk of incurring extremely
large individual lifetime costs. Our proposed methodology is illustrated with a
case study. According to our risk measure, the current Spanish public LTC system
mitigates individual risk by more than 30% compared to the situation where no
public protection were available. We show that our method can be used to compare
risk reduction of alternative LTC insurance plans.
1 Introduction and motivation
Long-Term Care (LTC) expenditures will rise greatly over the next several decades
because of population ageing and cost of services increase. This is well known
and for many years, economists have fueled a debate on whether a public system
coverage versus an exclusively private LTC insurance compete or can efficiently be
combined. Brown and Finkelstein (2009) argue that the Medicaid programme in
the US crowds-out private insurance demand, while according to Kessler (2008), the
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market for LTCI is growing rapidly in countries which do have a public protection
system such as Spain, Italy and South Korea, but stagnating elsewhere such as in
Germany, the UK and the European Nordic countries.
Individual and family resources pay for a substantial proportion of long-term care
costs, often out-of-pocket at the point of need. Public schemes are expensive and
can only target a small population group, namely the poorer and/or those in clearly
strong need of support. In many European countries LTC public systems exist, but
they have not really been fully understood by most citizens because public LTC
systems cost a lot to the states, but only benefit a few. In this context, unlike for
most universal welfare protection rights such as education or health, LTC systems
seem to be relegated to play a residual role (Mayhew et al, 2010).
Private or mandatory public LTC protection schemes should be presented to
the society in such a way that it becomes transparently clear why they effectively
mitigate the risk of incurring extremely large lifetime LTC costs. This could sub-
stantially improve risk perception compared to the present under-evaluation of the
potential magnitude of the long-term care burden (Zhou et al., 2010).
The effectiveness of LTC insurance schemes as risk transfer instruments has
not been discussed in the literature. Moreover, it is difficult to compare existing
alternative LTC protection strategies, specially for elaborating international corre-
spondences because each country has very specific regulations as seen in Taleyson
(2003).
Our goal is to define possible risk measures and we will use them to compare
the effectiveness of LTC protection systems as risk transfer instruments. Risk mea-
surement is essentially aimed at evaluating both the likelihood that a loss occurs
and the magnitude of this loss. We will propose a method to asses how much risk is
mitigated by a LTC protection system that would otherwise be kept by individuals
or their families. Quantitative risk measurement relies on statistical concepts and
provides tools to obtain a numerical value that represents the risk level of a potential
loss.
In general, risk mitigation finds ways to reduce risk and when addressing eco-
nomic losses, the simplest way to mitigate risk is to transfer it to someone else, who
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would cover the cost if the loss occurs in exchange of a premium. Risk transfer is
also easily achieved by sharing the risk with other individuals that also have the
possibility that a loss occurs to them. Therefore, in our situation, the way to miti-
gate the risk that an individual has to spend an enormous amount of money during
his or her lifetime is to subscribe to a LTC coverage protection scheme, that would
share the expenditure among participants in the programme.
Formal definitions of risk measures are available and their mathematical prop-
erties have been studied in the literature on risk management and insurance (see,
for instance, McNeil et al. 2005, Coles, 2001, Panjer, 2006, Panjer et al. 2008).
Our contribution is to adapt these measures to the analysis and comparison of LTC
insurance alternatives. When it comes to practice, it is assumed that the loss is a
random variable and risk measurement requires that an estimate of the statistical
distribution of the loss is available. Our random variable is the cost of LTC over
lifetime.
2 Notation and basic concepts
We denote by X0 the cost of lifetime LTC from a given age t to death assuming that
there is no level of protection so that the individual has to pay for all costs of services
aimed at his or her care. At age t the value of X0 is unknown mainly due to the
uncertainty about the duration of the need for care and the inflation of the cost of
services. Note that there could also be innovations on therapies that would change
the evolution on disability rates. So, we can assume that X0 is a random variable
which follows a probability distribution with a probability distribution function
F0(x), for x ≥ 0, defined as the probability that the lifetime cost of LTC from age
t is not larger than x.
We will assume Xp is the cost of lifetime LTC for an individual at age t if he
or she subscribes to a protection plan so that part (or all) of the cost of LTC in
X0 is covered by an insurance scheme, either private or public or both. Indeed the
state can propose a universal coverage system, for instance. In that case the final
value of Xp is also unknown to the person at age t, and it will only become known
once the person dies. At age t, Xp is a random variable which follows a probability
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distribution function Fp(x), x ≥ 0 which is the probability that the lifetime cost of
LTC not covered by the external protection is not larger than x.
For any given random variable we can define risk measures that can be used to
evaluates its level of risk. We aim at quantifying the risk transfered from X0 to the
external part, so from the individual to the insurance plan or the public protection
programme. One simple way to do that is by comparing the distribution of X0 and
Xp or their respective risk measures.
3 The Value-at-Risk of LTC lifetime individ-
ual expenditure
Assume we fix a probability level α, α ∈ (0, 1). It means we are only considering
the cost of LTC that is incurred by the α100% of the population that is going to
spend more money on LTC. It means we are interested in the worst cases.
The notion Value-at-Risk with level α is related to the notion of quantile and is
defined as follows:
V aRα (Xj) = inf {x, Fj (x) ≥ α} . j = 0, p (1)
The interpretation for the Value-at-Risk at level α of individual lifetime LTC
cost under protection scheme j, j = 0 or j = p is straightforward. There is α100%
of the population aged t that will spend at least V aRα (X0) if there is no protection
and at least V aRα (Xp) if protection p is covers him or her. Another way to interpret
Value-at-Risk is that a (1−α)100% percent of the population aged t will spend less
than V aRα (X0) if there is no protection but less than V aRα (Xp) under protection
p. All the previous interpretations do have to be considered in the context of a
probability space. They have been widely used for assessing financial risk (Jorion,
2001, Klu¨ppelberg et al., 1999).
We will define the amount of risk mitigation of policy p, with respect to the
scenario where the whole burden is on the individual, based on the concept of
Value-at-Risk as:
RM1(α; 0; p) = V aRα (X0)− V aRα (Xp) . (2)
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The main drawback of RM1(α; 0; p) is that there must be a consensus on which
is the α level that is going to be chosen for comparative purposes.
Once α is fixed, RM1(α; 0; p) can be computed for several protection alternatives
p and one can say that a policy is more effective than another if it has a larger risk
mitigation.
4 Conditional tail expectation or Tail-Value-
at-Risk of LTC lifetime individual expenditure
If we would like to average values at risk with respect to different α levels, then we
can use the notion of Tail Value at Risk at level α0. Let us assume that α0 ∈ (0, 1)
is a fixed confidence level. We would like to examine all Value-at-Risk at levels
between α0 and 1.
The definition of Tail-Value-at-Risk with a given level probability α0 is:
TV aRα0 (Xj) =
1
(1− α0)
∫ 1
α0
V aRα (Xj) dα j = 0, p.
The previous definition is mathematically equivalent, under adequate sufficient
smoothness conditions for the distribution function of Xj , j = 0, p, to a conditional
expectation:
TV aRα0 (Xj) = E(Xj |Xj > V aRα0). j = 0, p (3)
where E denotes the mathematical expectation as usual.
The Tail-Value-at-Risk can be interpreted as an average for all Value-at-Risk
cases above a level α0. In our case, it is the expected value of lifetime LTC costs
with no protection (X0) or with protection (Xp) for the α0100% group of individuals
aged t who will experience costs larger than V aRα0 . So, it concentrates on the
average cost for the group that will make alarger expenditure.
Note that there are many possible ways to fix the value of α0. For instance, one
may say that α0 = 25%, and that would imply that TV aRα0 (Xj) corresponds to
the average cost incurred by the group that will pay more than the 75% percentile
with respect to Xj .
An interesting way to fix the value of α0 is somehow indirectly. Let us assume
that we define α0 as the level such that 1 − F0(x0) = α0, given that x0 is a fixed
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amount. In this case α0100% is defined as the percent of individuals aged t that
would pay lifetime LTC costs above x0. We could fix the value of x0 with respect
to a yearly minimum income level. It can also be fixed in absolute terms. Then
TV aRα0 (X0) would be interpreted as the average lifetime LTC cost incurred under
for those who would pay a lifetime LTC cost greater than x0.
Note that if α0 = 0 then we would just have that the Tail-Value-at-Risk is the
expected lifetime LT cost or the average of all individuals in the population.
We will define the amount of risk mitigation of policy p with respect to policy
0, RM2(α; 0; p), using the concept of Tail-Value-at-Risk as:
RM2(α0; 0; p) = TV aRα0 (X0)− TV aRα0 (Xp) . (4)
In order to compute RM2(α0; 0; p) a decision has to be made upon which α0
level is chosen. Once α0 is fixed, RM2(α0; 0; p) can be calculated for several protec-
tion alternatives p and one can score alternatives with respect to the gain in risk
mitigation.
The main drawback of the comparative capacity of RM2(α0; 0; p) for alternative
p policies is that the comparison is made between the distribution of the largest
cost incurred only. However, calculating RM2(α0; 0; p) is simple, once estimates of
the distribution functions F0 and Fp are available. Moreover, RM2(α0; 0; p) can be
interpreted directly as the reduction on the expected cost of individual lifetime LTC
cost for those that would incur lifetime LTC costs above a certain level without a
risk transfer programme p.
It is interesting to note that TV aRα0 (Xj) at a given level is a coherent risk
measure that has been used in many areas. It has risen independently in a variety
of fields and has been given names as Conditional Value-at-risk, Conditional Tail
Expectation or Expected Shortfall. It satisfies the so-called axioms of coherence,
namely translation invariance, subadditivity, positive homogeneity and monotonic-
ity. In particular, subadditivity means that if lifetime LTC costs are calculated as
the sum of types of costs, the Tail-Value-at-Risk with level α0 of the total cost is
smaller or equal than the sum of the Tail-Value-at-Risk with level α0 of each type
of cost.
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5 Using Tail-Value-at-Risk to rank alternative
social policies
Let us assume that X0 is the cost of lifetime long term care (LTC) from a given age
t to death assuming that there is no level of protection so that the individual has to
pay for all costs aimed at his or her care. X0 is a random variable which follows a
probability distribution function F0(x), x ≥ 0. This can be called the reference cost
distribution. Let us also assume that there are programmes that aim at reducing the
risk of incurring very large lifetime costs by means of a risk transfer. We will call the
lifetime LTC costs that would be paid if each of these alternative programmes are
implemented, Xp with p = 1, 2, ..., P , and their corresponding distribution functions
are called Fp, p = 1, 2, ..., P . Assume that the Tail-Value-at-Risk at a given level α0
for those distribution functions can be estimated.
We can define a percent reduction of the Tail-Value-at-Risk at level α0, which
we call the relative risk mitigation index as:
RM3(α0; 0; p) =
(
1− TV aRα0 (Xp)
TV aRα0 (X0)
)
· 100 (5)
Assuming that costs incurred are always positive and that Xp ≤ X0 almost
surely, which means that the probability that Xp is larger than X0 is zero then it
can be shown that RM3(α0; 0; p) is a score between zero and 100.
A technical difficulty in the comparison ofX0 andXp is that there is no guarantee
that that probability of X0 equals 0 is the same as the probability that Xp equals
0. Individuals may incur cost if there is no protection programme, while they may
have to pay nothing when p is implemented. The fact that X0 and Xp, p = 1, .., P
have a positive probability mass on 0, possibly not constant across all these random
variables poses a potential technical problem, because the portion of the population
group that incurs strictly positive cost varies from one scheme to another.
The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality and we do not recommend it
here as it mainly measures dispersion. We are not so much interest in examining
the range of possible lifetime LTC costs and its variability across a population age
group. We think that the aim of an efficient protection programme is to transfer
and share risk and in this sense we want to measure the ability to reduce the risk
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Figure 1: Value-at-risk for X0 (solid) and X1 (dotted), horizontal axis is α, simulated
lognormal data
born by citizens.
6 An example and computing tools
Let us compare two random variables X0 and X1 whose probability distribution
functions are known.
We have simulated lognormal data to have a shape similar to the one we would
expect in an application to lifetime LTC costs. This is an example that helps
to introduce the application of the relative risk mitigation index which has been
introduced in the previous section.
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Table 1: Risk measures and risk mitigation measures for simulated data (X0 and X1)
Value-at-Risk and Tail-Value-at-Risk
Level (α0) V aRα0 (X0) V aRα0 (X1) TV aRα0 (X0) TV aRα0 (X1)
15% 7.44 3.82 13.11 6.06
10% 9.37 4.62 15.42 6.96
5% 12.99 6.07 19.51 8.50
RM1(α0; 0; 1) RM2(α0; 0; 1) RM3(α0; 0; 1)
15% 3.62 7.05 54%
10% 4.75 8.46 55%
5% 6.92 11.01 56%
RM1(α0; 0; 1) indicates the difference in Value-at-Risk, RM2(α0; 0; 1) is the difference in
Tail-Value-at-Risk and RM3(α0; 0; 1) is the relative difference in Tail-Value-at-
Risk
Figure 1 shows the Value-at-Risk plot, i.e. V aRα (Xj) for α ∈ (0, 1) and j = 0, p.
This is also known as the quantile plot. One can see from the shapes in Figure 1
that for all levels of α, V aRα (X1) is lower than V aRα (X0).
Table 1 presents the Value-at-Risk in the simulated data for three α levels. We
have chosen α = 0.15, 0.10 and 0.05. Tail-Value-at-Risk at those same levels is also
shown.
Table 1 shows that the larger the α level, the higher the risk. This means
Value-at-Risk increases when the confidence parameter decreases, as expected. The
same happens as Tail-Value-at-Risk increases when α decreases as the measure
concentrates on the more extreme cases.
Using both Value-at-Risk and Tail-Value-at-Risk we see that risk mitigation
occurs when comparing X0 versus X1. For all three levels chosen, the risk of X1 is
lower than the risk of X0, consequently RM1(α0; 0; 1) and RM2(α0; 0; 1) are positive
for all values of α0.
The calculation of RM3(α0; 0; 1) for α0 = 0.15, 0.10 and 0.05 is also presented in
the last column of the bottom part of Table 1. The relative decrease in Tail-Value-
at-Risk for X1 compared to X0 is about 55% for all confidence levels.
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7 A case study: The public LTC system in
Spain
In December 2006 the Spanish parliament approved the so called Law of Depen-
dence, which was enforced in 2007. The law established a public long-term care
(LTC) system and granted new rights to citizens in need of personal assistance.
The law was recognized as a fourth pillar to the Spanish welfare system. Since
then, the Spanish general budged has assigned increasing levels of funds for citizens
needing LTC, and those funds have been set independently of public health funds.
The Law of Dependence in Spain provides support for all individuals from age
6, but elderly citizens are in fact much more prone to need some form of long term
care. The natural demographic evolution in Spain will cause a great increase in
the number of individuals above age 65 in the next decades and therefore this will
lead to an enormous potential increase in the number of people in need of care and
support. Wittenberg et al. (2002), Guille´n et al. (2007) and many others argue
whether living longer necessarily means that individuals will have a longer active
life or whether, on the average, elderly people will need support for a longer period
of time in the near future. Bolance et al. (2010) found that for the Spanish case
demand for LTC starts at a later age, but may last longer on average than in the
past. The prospects of an increase in unit cost of service necessarily implies an
increase in lifetime LTC cost for individuals. In addition, there are contributions
to the discussion on the role of public and private LTC insurance by Brown and
Finkelstein (2008, 2009), de Crasties (2009), Gleckman (2007) and Comas-Herrera
et al. (2011).
The demographic situation in Spain imposes an alert if the demand for long-term
care services increases sharply. In the absence of a well structured public network
for formal care in Spain, plus the economic frailty of the current public LTC system,
preserving the essence of the public scheme and promoting private LTC insurance
may be the best possible strategy.
Before the law has been passed, several forms of social protection have already
existed in Spain. Citizens with little economic resources, living alone and in need
of LTC were a priority, but there was no specific subsidy linked to the need of LTC
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for which citizens could apply. In fact, the public health system was effectively
providing assistance to people in need of LTC who had scarce resources, but this
created a burden for medical facilities and implied an inefficient use of hospitals.
The Spanish public system recognizes the right to receive support in case of
dependence. Emphasis is out on need of support, not on disability or handicap,
while budged allocated to social protection in Spain is among the very small in
Europe. However, a strong advertisement campaign when the law was enforced did
not create awareness, but reinforced the belief that the state is a strong safety net.
In 2010, the number of people receiving some form of allocation was 614,750. In
fact the form of service may be multiple, so 7,468 got a prevention plan; 74,775 got
tele-assistance; care at home was supplied to 78,968; a care at day or night centre
unit was assigned to 39,312 users; residential care was provided to 114,263; supple-
mentary service allocation was given to 50,803 and supplementary cash allocation
for family care was allowed to 357,599 Spanish citizen. Allocation for family care is
by far the most popular form of support from the public system.
The current Spanish LTC system is universal and funded by taxes. Entitlements
are based on the severity of dependence and not on the individual’s wealth and
income.
Bolance´, et al (2010) estimated the distribution function of lifetime LTC cost for
men aged 65 who would be classified as dependent by the Spanish public system,
using a large survey by the Spanish Statistical Institute in 2008. Respondents
were classified as elligible or non-elligible in terms of people that would be entitled
to receive a public allocation. They were also rated in the official scale levels of
severity. The same authors compared the distribution of lifetime LTC costs if no
public entitlements were available and the distribution of lifetime LTC costs if the
entitlements that are established by the Spanish regulation were applied, so that
cost would be partially covered by the state. More details can be found in their
report.
Table 2 presents the Value-at-Risk and the Tail-Value at Risk for three levels of
risk α0 = 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 for the distribution of lifetime LTC cost of those aged
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Figure 2: Value-at-risk of LTC costs of dependence in Spain for those aged 65 in 2008
with and without LTC public system, by gender
Table 2: Risk measures for lifetime LTC costs of dependence in Spain (2008)
Men aged 65
Value-at Risk Tail-Value-at Risk RM3(α0; 0; p)
Level (α0) X0 Xp X0 Xp
10% 111.8 84.9 220.1 141.8 36%
5% 210.9 136.9 277.7 175.4 37%
1% 314.6 211.8 330.6 229.4 31%
Women aged 65
Value-at Risk Tail-Value-at Risk
Level Without With Without With RM3
10% 251.2 157.8 302.4 192.0 37%
5% 304.7 189.0 331.2 214.5 35%
1% 346.5 232.6 353.3 330.6 31%
Cost is expressed in thousand Euros. X0 indicates all costs are payed by individuals
or their families and Xp indicates that the individual is covered by the public LTC
system.
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65 in 2008 in Spain. Two possibilities are considered, those the estimated lifetime
LTC cost distribution if individuals pay all services, i.e, without any public system
coverage or X0, and the distribution when the current public system covers some of
the LTC cost, which is what we called Xp in the previous sections
Our results show evidence that risk mitigation as defined in (5) exceeds 30%
both for men and women at any risk level. The interpretation then suggests that the
public system reduces the extremes on the lifetime LTC cost. The implementation
of the LTC public system guarantees that the highest or maximum possible cost
incurred by the majority of the population (i.e. 90% or more) is reduced by more
than 30% under the public LTC system.
By looking at the most extreme cases, the Tail-Value at Risk is also substan-
tially reduced under the current public LTC system. In other words, the average
cost for those people that would incur more expenses, especially if we look at the
highest decile. Average lifetime cost would also be much reduced for the 10% of the
population spending more on lifetime LTC costs.
However, when looking into the details of Table 2 we conclude that the Spanish
system still needs to consider that there is a risk of about 1% that a man will have to
spend about 229.4 thousand Euros and a risk of about 1% that a women will have to
spend about 330.6 thousand Euros to cover lifetime LTC costs. Unfortunately risk
mitigation may still seem too low for that small group, and policy makers should
perhaps consider to introduce some modifications. For instance, an individual that
has been dependent for a long period of time, even if his or her condition is not too
severe, may be exposed to an escalating accumulation of expenditures. This means
that duration in the state of dependency and not only severity needs to be taken
into consideration and introducing such a change would probably help to suggest a
different conclusion on the effectiveness of the public system when risk mitigation
would be assessed. We believe that our relative risk mitigation index RM3(α0; 0; p)
should be inversely related to α0 instead of the other way round as it is now.
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8 Discussion
Long-term care insurance either public mandatory or private plays a central role in
financing long-term care (Feder et al., 2007). It is also a more efficient approach
to covering lifetime expenditure than private savings, as it substantially reduces
the need for every single individual or family to save up to the maximum possible
lifetime cost of their care Insurance redistributes costs from those with lesser to
those with greater care needs. By pooling risks and reducing the uncertainty risk
averse individuals would prefer an actuarially fair insurance policy rather than the
possibility of a substantial loss (see, for instance Barr, 2010, Browne, 2006, and
Rivlin and Wiener, 1988).
Private long-term care insurance is always conditioned by the characteristics of
public sector coverage for long-term care the specific country where an individual
resides (Foubister et al., 2006, de Castries, 2009). In some countries like England or
the United States, the public social policies aim at people who cannot afford to pay
for their own care (Comas-Herrera et al., 2010, Miller et al., 2009). However, those
purchasing private insurance in those countries suffer the absence of a public safety
net and protect their own assets for a catastrophic event, i.e. the costs involved in
requiring a very long duration of care (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006, Pauly, 1990).
In some other countries where the public LTC system is universal, all individuals
are covered, or may be some means-tested benefits are introduced for those who
cannot cover their cost of LTC. This is the case of Germany, France and Spain,
where private LTC insurance complements the public system (Comas-Hererra et
al., 2011, Courbage and Roudaut, 2008, Guille´n and Pinquet, 2008).
There is a strong debate in Spain about the sustainability of the public long-term
care system. Concerns are rising about the equity of decisions in all the Autonomous
Communities about who is and who is not eligible. This poses many problems to
the political and social success of the Law, and there is a lot of criticism in the
media. Inequality is possible if people living in different areas would benefit from
different allocations and services simply because his or her Autonomous Community
dedicates a lot more budged to social programmes. And this is indeed the case,
because the development of social care networks and institutions has been much
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different from one Community to another and has thus created room for perverse
comparisons between Spanish citizens, who would in principal claim equal rights.
The relative risk mitigation index that we have proposed in the previous sections
can be used to address regional inequalities, because the LTC systems can be ranked
according to this score.
Many experts recommend, health and social services must reinforce prevention
to extend duration of active life among the elderly. In previous analysis we have
seen that three factors influence the increase of lifetime LTC cost in the last decade,
namely the increase of longevity, a longer duration in the state of dependence and
price of care services. Social policies should be devoted to reduce the length of time
spent in a state of dependence by promoting active life and they should also dictate
rules for the market to provide efficient services with a price evolution in line with
inflation.
Social protection should not set priority on moderate dependence and non-
eligible who still need care. The very extreme cases of lifetime LTC cost exist,
which makes it reasonable to focus on the most severe situation and some form of
compulsory insurance be imposed. Establishing public LTC systems such as the
Spanish case aimed at severe cases and make people understand that it can only
been an efficient risk mitigating tool if targeting the large costs is a good strategy.
The welfare system and pensions should take care of more frequent and with relative
low cost cases.
There are features of the Spanish case reform that have remained beyond the
scope of our case study. One of them is who more control on the assessment scores
given to applicants of the public system can be put in place, so that medical and so-
cial teams should be homogeneously qualified and evaluations peer reviewed. There
is an urgent need for monitoring existing deviations in some regions between the
expected number of eligible and the final number of allocations given. Clarifying
vague concepts in the severity scale is necessary, as well as understanding how,
why and when should the official score weights be changed. There are opinions in
favour of removing the current three severity levels score for dependents, so that
every point given in the measurement scale is linked to some kind of proportional
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allocation. The main drawback for this proposal is that some services, unlike cash,
cannot be assigned proportionally. Indeed, one person either gets one form of ser-
vice care or not, for instance, a residence. Another disadvantage is that not having
a limited number of severity levels makes it more difficult to design public policies
because it is difficult to identify worst classes. Another suggestion which has been
made in the past is the introduction of means-tested copayments, but then this can
lead to moral hazard because wealth can be transferred to third-parties in order to
obtain public subsidies. In fact this can have a deterrence effect towards extending
private insurance, similar to the phenomenon observed in the United States with
the existence of Medicare, where the market for private LTC coverage has remained
small.
The LTC insurance market in Spain is still very immature. The possibility
to deduct LTC insurance premiums from taxes in conjunction with pension plans
has been pointed out as a key driver and it has already been permitted to a very
limited extend. Currently, market premiums are still expensive. For instance, a
1,000 monthly annuity in the event of full dependence is priced at about 265 euros
for a man and 492 euros for a woman aged 50. The market tends to reject this sort
of product and would prefer some alternative where at least part of the cumulated
insurance premium could be passed on to heirs if no dependence annuity has been
received. Otherwise, consumers feel that money going into LTC insurance premiums
is lost savings.
Economic recession periods do not favour the development of LTC insurance.
Buying private long-term care insurance is not an easy task as the policyholder sees
that coverage aims at uncertain losses too far in the future. Generally a young
person knows little about the future of public LTC coverage and is very poorly
informed about his or her own risk of incurring lifetime LTC cost that exceed their
assets. Barr (2010) points out that a too generous public system can the collide
with private insure and produce unnecessary over-insurance.
Our contribution presents a new way to communicate about the risk of high
lifetime LTC costs and its sensitivity to alterantive forms of insurance coverage.
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